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1. New Issues 
The purpose of this paper is to identify some new issues in relation to organ 
donation and some arguments for alternative views on each issue. The 
parameters for what constitutes a new issue are: 
a) Changes to technology that affect the assumptions on 
which the resolution of issues has been based; 
b) Indications that there may be a shift in what is 
considered to be good medical practice and in the values 
being espoused by health professionals; 
c) New or different challenges to the values that have been 
accepted as good practice. 
• 
In the use of cadaveric organs and tissue there seem to be several new 
issues: 
326 
a) Registering consent rather than intent 
b) Donation after controlled death 
c) Differing standards over what is meant by "Brain 
Death" 
d) Use of less than suitable organs 
e) The role of the Designated Officer 
t) Justice and organ allocation 
g) Mutual consent to donor family-recipient contact 
h) Information, consent and disclosure of material factors 
that indicate donor identity. 
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In the use of organs and tissues from living donors the following 
issues are of new or renewed interest: 
a) Bodily integrity and "donation" by children and other 
dependant persons; 
b) Donors of greater health risk; 
c) Partial liver and lung lobe donation; 
d) Donation of less than ideal organs; 
e) Assessment of unrelated living donors; 
1) Paired and remunerated living donation; 
g) Information, consent and disclosure of material factors; 
that indicate donor identity; 
h) Internet canvassing for organs - privacy, exploitation 
and justice issues. 
2. Issues in Deceased Organ Donation 
2.1 The National Organ Donation Consent Register 
The recent establishment, by the Australian Health Ministers, of a 
new national organ donation consent register is a shift from what was an 
expression of one's wishes indicating intent, to a registered consent that is 
legally sufficient to pennit the removal of organs after death. This raises 
questions about whether such a consent overrides the objections of family 
members after death has occurred. 
An argument against allowing families to override registered consent 
by the deceased is that it is a matter of respect for autonomy that the 
deceased's wishes be respected and the consent register will improve the 
organ donation rate. • 
The atguments for allowing family members to override include the 
fact that it is accepted medical practice to respect the grieving process and 
not to antagonize families at that time. The donor is dead and it is the living 
who become the primary concern of the intensive care unit. It is in fact the 
living who make sacrifices in relation to allowing organ donation, 
foregoing the ordinary process of being with the relative during the normal 
process of death and coping with trying to understand brain death. 
2.2 Donation after cardiac death I 
The "Maastricht" categories for non-heart-beating donors2, now 
tern1ed "donation after cardiac death" (OeD) donors, have been developed 
as a way to divide potential donors on a clinical basis and are widely 
accepted internationally. 
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Category I: Dead on scene (out of hospital) - Unknown warm ischaemic 
time: "Uncontrolled" 
Category II: Unsuccessful resuscitation- Known warm ischaemic time: 
"Uncontrolled" 
Category III: Waiting cardiac death after planned treatment withdrawal -
Known and limited warm ischaemic time: "Controlled" 
Category IV: Cardiac arrest after confirmation of brain death but before 
planned organ procurement - Known and potentially limited warm 
ischaemic time: "Uncontrolled" 
In category II uncontrolled donors, the donor may die and the 
transplant team arrive before the donor 's next of kin can be contacted. It is 
controversial whether cannulation and perfusion can be started in these 
circumstances. On one hand, it can be considered a violation of the 
potential donor's autonomy to cannulate before their in-life wishes are 
known. On the other hand, delay in cannulation may mean that a patient's 
strongly-held wish to be a donor cannot be respected. 
Some hold the view that a doctor's duty of care to the still-living 
outweighs any duty of care to the dead. A compromise that may be reached 
is to cannulate if there is any evidence of a wish to donate (such as a donor 
card or registration as a donor) even in the absence of next-of-kin. 
There have been new developments of organ procurement following 
death from cessation of circulation in controlled circumstances (Category 
III). The timing of the death is planned, in a sense, as it happens as a result 
of deliberate withdrawal of ventilation. The decision to withdraw treatment 
is made, presumably on justifiable grounds such as that the ventilation is 
intrusive and may be considered overly burdensome when there is little or 
no prospect of recovery. , 
The issues that then arise include how much time must elapse after 
the heart stops beating before efforts may be made to recover organs and 
tissue, and whether procedures done for the purpose of preserving organs 
may begin before death has been determined. The proposals are to institute 
pharmaceutical therapy such as anti-coagulants and to undertake surgery to 
place large catheters in the femoral arteries to facilitate cold perfusion of 
organs after death. Such procedures done on persons who are still alive are 
not therapeutic for them, and the question arises as to whether anyone has 
the authority to consent to non-therapeutic procedures on the patient's 
behalf. It is assumed that the patient could consent to the procedures, if 
able to do so, as an act of altruism. However, provision of medical 
interventions, without the specific consent of the person, is not lawful in 
most jurisdictions where those interventions are not being used to save that 
person's life, prevent serious damage to their health, or alleviate significant 
pain or suffering. 
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Arguments against ante-mortem procedures to facilitate organ 
preservation in the absence of a specific expression of consent by the 
patient include the view that consent to organ donation presumes that death 
will have occurred and the literature up until now has tended to be 
reassuring in that respect. Consent to donation after death cannot be 
presumed to be consent to procedures done prior to death. Second, the next 
of kin or other representatives do not have the legal authority, in most 
jurisdictions, to consent to non-therapeutic procedures. There is also 
concern that the issue may confuse the already vexed issue of donation 
after death by the brain criterion. 
Arguments for ante-mortem procedures include the view that if the 
patient wanted to be a donor, then it is in his or her interests for the 
procedures to be done in order to facilitate donation. The procedures 
increase the availability and the quality of the organs able to be obtained. 
Thus arguably given that he or she wanted to be a donor, he or she would 
have wanted ante-mortem procedures to be done to facilitate that donation. 
There is an issue in thi s over what it means for something to be in 
someone's best interests. Is the phrase "best interests" synonymous with 
"preferred would or would have been preferred" or does the phrase have 
meaning in terms some sense of being objectively related to that person's 
well-being, etc. There does seem to be a sense in which I can prefer that 
which is not in my best interests. That is implied in the phrase "altruistic 
preference. " 
The manner in which death is to be diagnosed after withdrawal of 
ventilation and cessation of circulation is also problematic. The legal 
definition generally covers the two possibilities of irreversible cessation of 
all function of the brain or in'eversible cessation of circulation. There is a 
move in some protocols to use the phrase "permanellt cessation of 
circulation," which has a slightly different meaning. Having decided not to 
restore ventilation and not to attempt resuscitation , cessation of circulation 
may indeed be permanent, but not irreversible. Is not being able to be 
resuscitated a criterion for determining death by the circulation criterion, or 
has death occurred simply when circulation has ceased? 
Obviously the timing is crucial, if one must wait until irreversibility, 
then one will presumably have lost the use of a viable heart for 
transplantation, and may have lost other organs that are sensitive to warm 
ischaemia, such as the liver or the insulin producing islets from the 
pancreas. 
A solution may be to insist that sufficient time has elapsed for a 
determination to be made that irreversible cessation of brain function has 
occurred. There are considerable arguments amongst clinicians about what 
constitutes sufficient time and the protocols differ from one place to 
another. 
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My view is that in the interests of community understanding and 
acceptance of deceased organ donation, there should be no moderation of 
the current definition of death and that the notion of irreversibility should 
be retained. 
A possible interpretation of irreversibility in this context is to say that 
the cessation of circulation is irreversible unless overly burdensome and 
unwelcome interventions are re-established. This would allow the 
diagnosis of death even though "death" is not strictly irreversible. 
2.3 Differing standards over what is meant by "Brain Death" 
There are challenges to the consensus in relation to the determination 
of death by the cessation of brain function criterion. The challenges are 
numerous and from both directions. Some are arguing for a more relaxed 
standard than cessation of all function of the brain, and there are 
indications of some medical acceptance of the view that brain death can be 
determined even though some brain functions continue. This is the position 
that is now held by the Australia and New Zealand Intensive Care Society 
and may be regarded as the new orthodoxy. At the other extreme some are 
arguing that the original consensus was mistaken and that a person remains 
integrated and alive, even though brain function has ceased. 
Death of a human being is the end of the life of that being. 
Historically that was associated with the permanent cessation of respiration 
and circulation. When that happened the breakdown of the body, 
putrefaction, began soon after. Theologically (across religions and 
cultures) it was thought that that breakdown of the body indicated that the 
life force or soul had gone. The link between cessation of cardiac and 
respiratory function and inevitable putrefaction allowed death to be diag-
nosed by cardiac and respiratory failure. In Christian f)ractice it was still 
possible to administer the sacraments (which can only be administered to 
the living) until putrefaction, even if respiration and circulation had ceased. 
The Advent of Brain Death 
In modem times, ventilators permitted respiration without brain stem 
function and thus interrupted what would have been a progression from 
death of the brain stem to cessation of respiration, cessation of cardiac 
function and then death of the tissue generally (putrefaction). This 
challenged traditional notions of death and gave rise to the notion of 
determining death by the cessation of all brain function, or "brain death". 
This was the standard medical view for which medical criteria were 
devised in the 1970s known as the Harvard criteria and accepted by the US 
President's Commission in 198P and by the Royal Colleges of Medicine 
in the UK. 
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Recent Bioethical Discussion 
More recently, there has been some acceptance that death has 
occuned when there is permanent loss of consciousness and loss of the 
capacity for spontaneous respiration. By these cliteria, "brain death" may 
be diagnosed even though some functions of the brain (other than 
consciousness) may be retained. Some bioethicists argue for a permanent 
loss of consciousness definition. 
Causes of Community Confusion 
In the community there is some confusion over the terminology. 
"Brain dead" is a term that may be applied in the technical sense of 
permanent cessation of all function of the brain, but it may also be applied 
to a person in permanent or persistent coma, to a person in a state of post 
coma umesponsiveness, to a person in a state of minimal consciousness, 
and, perhaps not entirely seriously, to someone with a bad hangover. 
Mainstream Acceptance 
Underlying these cultural differences within Australia would seem to 
be several distinct notions about the significance of life, and hence of the 
meaning of death. For some, the differences reflect a different 
understanding of the ontology of a human being. That is to say, for some a 
human being is only human to the extent that he or she continues to have 
the patticularly human capacity for rational autonomy. For others, a human 
being is a member of the human family whatever his or her capacities. The 
former are likely to accept permanent loss of consciousness as death. The 
latter tend to focus on the reality of the being continuing to live as an 
integrated body. This latter view seems to have been the mainstream view 
that saw the permanent cessation of all function of the brain.adopted as the 
legal definition and distinguished this state from a state of permanent coma 
and from a state of post coma unresponsiveness. The acceptance of the 
diagnosis of death by the permanent loss of all brain function criterion 
seems to have been based on the view that some brain function is necessary 
to maintain the integration of the functions of the various patts or organs of 
the body. There is another group who take a similar integrationist view to 
the mainstream, but argue that there remains sufficient integration of the 
body in a person with cardiac and supported respiratory function, even 
after the brain has ceased all function. 
Brain Death and Religion 
Mainstream religious views generally accept the integrationist view, 
seeing the human person as an embodied spirit. Loss of integration can be 
accepted as reflecting a loss of the presence of a soul. The permanent loss 
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of consciousness view is more likely to be adopted by those who take a 
non-religious or materialist view of the human being. 
Currently most of the Christian Churches have expressed an 
acceptance of death according to the loss of all function of the brain 
criterion. The notion that death may be diagnosed by a state of 
permanent loss of consciousness while some brain function is retained 
does not seem to have been addressed by the Christian Churches in any 
authoritative way. 
In 1985 the Islamic Organisation for Medical Sciences, meeting in 
Kuwait, endorsed adopted brain death using the Harvard criteria for 
determining that death of all functions of the brain had occUlTed. The 
Congress ofIslamic Jurisprudence subsequently reviewed this favorably in 
1986.4 
Judaism prohibits deriving benefit from mutilating or delaying the 
burial of a corpse but this prohibition can be oven'idden to save a life. This 
is variously interpreted in relation to diagnosing death and obtaining 
organs for transplant. 
Shintoism opposes the concept of brain death. Hinduism does not 
have a formal structure of guidelines or edicts with respect to such issues. 
As far as it is possible to ascertain their views on the matter, Hindu and 
Vedic scholars accept the concept of brain death. The concept of gi ving or 
daan is ingrained in Hindu thought.s 
The immediate problem seems to be that the clinical criteria that 
have become the medically accepted standard for determining death do not 
exclude the possibility of what Veatch refers to as lingering integrative 
brain functions. 6 These include the functions of the hypothalamic-pituitary 
axis in the mid-brain that continue to bring about control of various organs, 
and various other functions of the lower brain. • 
A response made to defend the clinical criteria for whole brain is 
often to distinguish functions of the brain thought to be unimportant or 
insignificant. This is the approach taken by the Australia and New Zealand 
Intensive Care Society.7 A problem is that the criteria thus no longer match 
the legal definition which depends on irreversible cessation of all functions 
of the brain. 
ANZICS also adopts a different definition of death than the legal 
standard, stating 
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The term "brain death" should be used when death is certified 
using the brain function criteria. Brain death is established by the 
documentation of irreversible coma and ilTeversible loss of brain 
stem reflex responses and respiratory centre function or by the 
demonstration of the cessation of intracranial blood flow. (p. 7) 
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The cunent situation thus would seem to be open to legal challenge. 
The danger that I perceive is that the making of distinctions between 
important and unimportant brain functions is to some extent subjective and 
perhaps arbitrary and it is also becoming less and less distinguishable from 
the notion that death is simply a state of ineversible loss of consciousness. 
This view is problematic for two reasons: 
a) There are some philosophical and theological leaps to be made if 
one is to make human life synonymous with mental functioning 
including an acceptance of either materialism or dualism. The 
implication for us would seem to be a rejection of the Council of 
Vienne that adopted the Boethiusl Aquinas notion of the unity that 
is the human person. 
b) Ineversible loss of consciousness is not a diagnosable state. 
Consciousness is an inference we draw from a person 's behavior. 
Loss of consciousness is not an observable or measurable 
phenomenon. 
The approach I have advocated is that we should retain the definition 
of death as the loss of all functions of the brain and that that agreed 
definition be properly applied. The clinical tests are thus just a part of the 
process to confirm that the loss of brain function does indeed extend to the 
lower brain. The clinical criteria ought not, on their own, be taken as 
determinative of death. They are tests only for some of the lower brain 
functions and not tests for brain function generally nor even for all lower 
brain functions. It is my understanding that it is the practice of cautious 
physicians not to depend on the clinical criteria alone but .ather to depend 
on their knowledge of the nature of the injury and the processes by which 
destruction of the brain may occur and on the basis of a judgment, often 
supported by ancillary testing, to reach a conclusion that cessation of all 
brain function has occuned, before instituting the confirmatory routine of 
the specified clinical tests. 
This is consistent with the view taken by Pope John Paul 118: 
It is a well-known fact that for some time certain scientific 
approaches to ascertaining death have shifted the emphasis from 
the traditional cardio-respiratory signs to the so-called 
"neurological" criterion . Specifically, this consists in establishing, 
according to clearly determined parameters commonly held by the 
international scientific community, the complete and irreversible 
cessation of all brain activity (in the cerebrum, cerebellum and 
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brain stem). This is then considered the sign that the individual 
organism has lost its integrative capacity. 
With regard to the parameters used today for asceltaining death -
whether the "encephalic" signs or the more traditional cardio-
respiratory signs - the Church does not make technical decisions. 
She limits herself to the Gospel duty of comparing the data 
offered by medical science with the Christian understanding of the 
unity of the person, bringing out the similarities and the possible 
conflicts capable of endangering respect for human dignity. 
Different Approaches to Brain Death: 
Disaggregators 
Death is a process not a single event and it is a question of when 
changes in behavior are penniued, not death event (Peter Singer) 
Integrationists 
l. Loss of all brain function (Harvard, President's Commission, 
Royal Colleges, Human Tissue Acts) 
2. Somaticists - no integration at organ level (Alan Shewmon) 
Mentalists or mental integrationists 
Permanent lost consciousness or ilTeversible coma (sometimes 
coupled with loss of spontaneous respiration) - ANZICS, Robert 
Veatch? 
Ethical [ssues in Explaining Brain Death 
When discussing brain death, health professiona~s need to bear in 
mind that the understanding that a person has may simply lack information 
about the medical reality that has occurred when the brain is destroyed, but 
there may also be cultural differences that lead to different levels of 
acceptance of the concept of determining death by the brain function 
criterion. Those differences may be particularly confusing if there are 
different uses of the termjnology amongst health professionals. 
In principle, health professionals should only apply the term "brain 
death" to those circumstances in which it has been determjned, by those 
who are qualified to make the diagnosis, that there is permanent cessation 
of all function of the brain. They should take great care to distinguish this 
state from those various states in which there is severe brain damage, and 
even permanent loss of consciousness, but some continuing brain 
functions . 
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In the process of dealing with informing a family of the diagnosis of 
brain death, it is reasonable that members of the family have the 
opportunity to see one of the testing processes taking place. 
The practice, sometimes employed, of ancillary testing to produce 
evidence of lack of blood circulation to the brain, such as an ultrasound 
image or an X-Ray image using contrast medium, may greatly benefit the 
process both at the time and subsequently when the trauma of events and 
later grieving may otherwise affect understanding and acceptance. 
2.4 Use of less than suitable organs 
There is a growing tendency to use organs that would once have been 
considered not suitable for use. This is partly due to changes in the ability 
to control rejection and partly due to demand for organs and confidence in 
the outcomes. 
This does raise justice questions about who gets the better or the less 
than ideal organs. It also raises questions about whether the patient is 
infooned about the quality of the organ being provided. 
There are also attempts to match features so that an older person is 
more likely to be given an organ from an older donor, a person who is 
already tested positive for a transmissible disease may be given an organ 
from a person with the same disease. 
These matters raise questions for the organ allocation algorithms as 
well as the overall safety of organ transplantation. 
2.5 Justice and organ allocation 
The diffeling approaches to the allocation of organs and the weight 
given to the factors involved in the algorithm raise justice considerations 
and questions to do with equal access to health care and omwhat basis one 
might discriminate. 
The key principle underpinning the allocation process is that there 
should be no discrimination between potential recipients on the basis of: 
a) race, nationality, religious belief, gender, marital status, sexual 
orientation, logistics, social status, disability or age (except where 
conditions associated with the patient's age directly determine the 
likelihood of a poorer outcome); 
b) linkage with willingness of family to be donors (after death); 
c) the patient's need for a transplant arising from past behavior; 
d) capacity to pay; or 
e) willingness to participate in experimentation, except where it is a 
trial for a novel transplant procedure that requires follow-up and audit. 
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Allocation of organs is a complex process that depends on a range of 
factors besides medical need and capacity to benefit. There is an 
unpredictable element in the process in that organs have to be matched to 
recipients. This means that potential recipients may remain on waiting lists 
for variable periods of time unrelated to their medical need, but dependent 
upon a matched organ becoming available. 
Transplant units should use organs as best they can, and balance 
medical need with likelihood of successful transplantation. It is legitimate 
that the following criteria be taken into account in considering potential 
recipients: 
a) length of time waiting for a transplant, taken from the time that 
illness progressed to a point that a transplant would be of 
immediate benefit; 
b) important medical factors , such as the closeness of tissue-
matching and matching of organ quality with the patient's medical 
status to maximize the likelihood of success; 
c) the urgency of a transplant given the likely rate of degeneration 
of health without transplant therapy, especially if patient survival is 
immediately threatened by that degeneration; 
d) need in terms of how sick the patient is without transplant 
therapy, and the prospects for 
e) transplant therapy producing a better outcome; 
t) logistic factors in making the transplant available to the recipient 
within the time frame; 
g) whether the patient has dependents; and 
h) whether the patient is reasonably likely (with or without 
assistance) to comply with the treatment regime necessary to 
secure graft survival. 
2.6 The role of the designated officer 
Different practices and greater sophistication between hospitals in 
the various roles of the Designated Officer who canies the responsibility 
for approving the procurement process in an institution, the transplant 
coordinator and the donor coordinator have emerged. 
In the various jurisdictions, designated officers have a role of 
oversight of the organ procurement process. The task is, in reality, one of 
ensuring that each of the necessary steps has been properly documented in 
relation to the determination of death, the separation of clinical roles and 
the obtaining of consent. The role is even more crucial in the circumstances 
of donation after cardiac death in controlled circumstances. 
Some hospitals retain this as a role for a senior medical administrator 
who has been adequately trained in the ethical, legal and medical issues 
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involved. Some delegate the role to the medical staff in the intensive care 
unit, including relatively junior staff. 
The arguments for delegation to juniors concern the need for 
someone to be available at odd times and urgently. 
The arguments against delegation to juniors concerns the fact that 
this is an oversight role and involves the officer ensuring compliance with 
the ethical, legal and medical standards. It is thought that such a person 
needs to have the authority to provide that oversight and that may be 
difficult for a relatively junior person. 
There are also numerous issues to do with the timing of 
approaches to families for donation and who should make that 
approach. There are two schools of thought as to whether those who are 
caring for the donor should be the first to broach the question, given 
that the matter of donation potentiality could be seen to compromise 
care of the patient. On the other hand they have an established 
relationship with the family. There are also questions as to when the 
donor coordinators become involved, whether before or after the 
information is given and consent obtained. 
2.7 Mutual consent to donor family-recipient contact 
The procurement of organs from deceased persons has developed as 
an anonymous process to protect recipients and donor families from 
unwarranted intrusion into their privacy. 
A negative aspect of that is that rather than giving and receiving, with 
all its humanness, the anonymity has meant that the process, for the 
participants, has been more like taking and getting organs. 
Also confusing the matter is that without that information recipients 
may fantasize about the nature of the person from whom the organ came 
including race, gender, etc. Donor families may envisage that the 
personality of the donor somehow continues in the recipients and that may 
complicate grieving. Donor hearts and eyes seem to be significant subjects 
of fantasy in that respect. 
In recent years efforts have been made by the donor and transplant 
co-ordinators to facilitate the exchange of non-identifying information by 
way of recipients sending anonymous letters of thanks to donor families 
and reports being given of how well recipients are doing. 
However there are people who would like to have more personal 
contact. The latter does however raise the question of the possibility of 
inappropriate contact and even possessiveness between grieving donor 
family and recipients. 
The suggestion has been that there be the possibility of a managed 
process with mutual consent and access to counseling, much as there is 
now with adoptee and relinquishing parent contact. 
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Complicating all this is the fact that it is not difficult for 
identification of donors to be made via death notices and coupling the day 
of death and death notice information with other information that may be 
available that would otherwise have been non-identifying. There may also 
be news reports relating to a sudden death which allow linkage to be made. 
Health professionals are bound by confidentiality on this matter, and 
they can find themselves unable to provide the counseling and other 
support that may be required once identification is made by the parties. 
An argument for a mutual consent register is that it would allow a 
well-conducted process to be established. 
2.8 Information, consent and disclosure of material factors that 
indicate donor identity 
Information about a donor's age and state of health, other physical 
attributes and manner of death may affect the quality of the organs 
available for transplantation. That information would seem to be material 
to the decision made by a recipient to accept or reject the offer of an organ 
for transplant. . 
The provision of that information however does increase the 
probability that the recipient could identify the donor. There is thus a 
potential conflict between the duty of disclosure and the right to privacy 
and the legal requirement of confidentiality. The question arises as to 
whether it may be demanded that the recipient waive the right to receive 
that material information as a condition of being on the list for 
transplantation. 
3. Issues in Living Donation 
3.1 Bodily integrity and "donation" by children and other dependant 
persons 
There is a growing incidence of living related donation of organs or 
tissue by children and by others in dependant relationships, such as adults 
with cognitive impairment. This raises questions about a right to bodily 
integrity, conflicts of interests for parents and guardians making decisions 
for one family member to donate to another, and whether there is a need for 
an independent detemunation that organ or tissue donation is in the donor's 
best interests. 
Donation by children is ethically complex. They will often be sought 
as a donor to a sister or brother, particularly for bone marrow donation. It is 
difficult and, in cases of very young children, impossible to ensure that 
children have a full understanding of what is involved. Because of their 
immaturity and dependence, children are very vulnerable and great care 
must be taken to protect their interests. For these reasons, donation by 
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children should only occur in circumstances in which it is thought the 
donation is in that child's best interests. 
Where parents make the decision, they will face the issue of whether 
it is appropriate at all to subject one child to intrusive procedures and risks 
for the sake of another. There is at stake a fundamental issue of respect for 
the bodily integrity of a child. It ought not be the case that a living child's 
body or body parts are seen as a mere resource for another child. 
Irrespective of the needs of another, each child has a right to bodily 
integrity and thus not to be invaded. 
However, the death of a sister or brother may be such a serious tlu'eat 
to the well-being of a potential donor that their overall interests would be 
more damaged by their sibling's death than by the discomforts of, say. a 
bone man-ow transplant. In that case becoming a donor may be in the donor 
child 's best interests and thus consistent with respect for the integrity of 
that child. 
As a child matures, he or she will be able to have a better 
understanding of such matters and a clearer appreciation of the 
significance of his or her own decisions. Hence, although legally still a 
minor, an older child may in practice take a more active part in such 
decision-making than a younger child. 
Some people see the family as an intimate group in which the 
interests of one member are strongly linked to the interests of all: they 
argue that the good of the family as a whole is more important than the 
interests of only one member. But this argument and the balancing of 
interests within a family must occur within limits and one of those limits is 
respect for bodily integrity. 
Decisions to permit a child to be a living donor will only be ethically 
acceptable where: , 
a) the risks to the child donor are minimal; 
b) the donation is to a person - such as a sibling - with whom the 
child has an intimate relationship; 
c) the donation is a last resort in treatment for the recipient; 
d) the proposed transplant is of proven efficacy and such expected 
benefit to the recipient, and thus indirectly to his or her sibling, and 
the risks and discomforts for the donor child so minimal, that an 
independent judgment is made that donating the organ or tissue on 
behalf of the donor child is in his or her best interests; 
e) the parents consent and the child (if she or he is able to do so) 
agrees or assents - the child's understanding of the donation and 
transplantation may be incomplete, but efforts must be made to 
ensure that his or her understanding is as thorough as possible, 
consistent with his or her age; and 
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t) where required by law, a court or tribunal authorization has been 
obtained to undertake a non-therapeutic procedure on a child on 
the basis that the procedure is in that child's interests. 
The same issues may arise for decisions to take organs from adult 
persons with cognitive impairment and in dependant relationships. 
3.2 Donors of greater health risk 
There is a trend toward accepting donors who have health 
assessments that indicate increased risks to them following donation, for 
instance, conditions such as raised sugar levels or hypertension or a family 
hi story of disease or genetic predisposition that indicate a greater risk to 
them of loss of function following donation. 
The trend occurs in both related and unrelated donation . A well-
motivated person may be prepared to donate despite the risks, especially in 
the circumstances of a close relative in need. 
There may also be circumstances in which a donor may be prepared 
to lose a function for the sake of a recipient. The latter may be particularly 
the case for a parent donating to a child or between spouses. 
The question arises as to whether there are professional ethical limits 
to donation beyond the requirement that the donor has made a free and 
informed choice. The traditional principle has been that a medical 
professional should first do no harm (primum non nocerre). 
Some organs, such as a partial liver (especially the right lobe) or the 
lobe of a lung may involve greater risk to the donor than has customarily 
been considered to be medically acceptable. One could also envisage a 
person donating a cornea and thus losing the function of binocular vision. 
Arguments for allowing significant harm or tisk t~ donors may be: 
a) A simple risk-benefit analysis in which one simply aggregates 
risk and benefit to the parties involved and calculates an overall 
benefit may be offered as justification on the grounds of utility. 
b) The self-identification of a person 's interests with those of his or 
her child, or with a spouse or partner, may also be offered as 
justification for a likely significant harm or risk to the donor, 
which would otherwise be considered unacceptable. 
An argument against allowing significant harm or risk to donors 
issue is the fact that transplantation involves a team of health professionals 
having professional obligations to the donor and to the community to 
practice medicine in a way that preserves personal and bodily integrity. 
Consent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for medical 
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intervention. Medicine has its own standards of what may be considered 
professionally acceptable conduct. 
The taking of regenerative tissue or the taking of a kidney when a 
person is well and would retain adequate renal function through the 
remaining kidney have been considered satisfactory because the risk of 
long term harm is minimal and because the removal involved no loss of 
functional integrity. 
Arguably left lobe liver (mortality rate of around 1 :500) or lung lobe 
donation are in this category, though the risks of left liver lobe removal are 
relatively high and the removal of a lung lobe does diminish lung capacity 
and hence some function as well as being otherwise risky. 
There may be a distinction between losing functions altogether and 
merely diminishing functions that may be applied to lung lobe removal. 
This prompts questions such as whether it would be legitimate for a 
spouse to donate a hand to a partner who had lost both hands? They would 
then both have one hand and that may be better for them as a couple on 
utilitarian grounds, but would that loss of function be an acceptable 
outcome from the perspective of it being deliberately caused by surgical 
intervention? 
Consent of the victim is not a defense to causing grievous bodily 
harm. The presumption in organ donation has been that the donor is left 
functionally intact. The 2001 Catholic Health Australia Code of Ethical 
Standards9 (n. 3.18), following in the Catholic Tradition expresses it: 
Donation of non-regenerative tissue is only permissible when this 
will not impair function, be detrimental to the discharge of the 
donor 's responsibilities, or involve serious danger to the donor's 
life, future health or identity. 
• A violent husband may still be prosecuted even if his wife returns to 
him and to the abusive relationship and she refuses to assist prosecution. 
Blood sports are, by and large, prohibited even between consenting adults. 
(Note that boxing is an exception but is meant to be regulated and to be 
undertaken wearing gloves that minimize harm and to be refereed such that 
fights are stopped when someone is badly hurt). 
In those terms taking an organ from a loving, consenting donor does 
raise a question as to whether that is permissible when the removal would 
cause loss of function or grave risk to health or life. 
3.3 Paired and remunerated living donation 
Paired and remunerated living "donation". Paired donation occurs 
when a family member wants to donate but there is not compatibility, so 
instead they donate the organ to others in exchange for a compatible donor 
being found for their relative. That raises an issue as to whether that 
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constitutes trade in human organs. There is pressure for governments to 
provide financial compensation to living donors for time lost from work 
and other financial costs to them. It is suggested that a distinction may be 
made between financial compensation in that respect and paying them for 
the organ or tissue. 
The CHA Code of Ethical Standards (n. 3.16) expresses it thus: 
Parts of the human body are not to be treated as commodities. 
Trade in human body parts is unacceptable, as is any other 
disrespectful use of the organs or tissues of a living or deceased 
person. 
In principle, a person offering an organ in exchange for a relative 
receiving a compatible organ from someone else is a trade in a human body 
part. Is it somehow different and ought it to be allowed or facilitated by 
establishing a register for such exchanges to occur? 
3.4 Internet canvassing for organs - privacy, exploitation and justice 
issues 
The use of the internet to canvas donation of an organ from unrelated 
living donors has resulted in an inability of the medical teams to protect 
anonymity and prevent exploitation of one party by another. The justice 
issues involved in some patients being better placed to secure a donor than 
others and the inequalities of access thus generated. It is also difficult when 
there are prior anangements between donors and recipients to prevent 
persons asking for or accepting payment for their organs. 
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